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A B S T R A C T   
We estimate the potential impact of COVID-19 on the United Kingdom economy, including direct disease effects, 
preventive public actions and associated policies. A sectoral, whole-economy macroeconomic model was linked 
to a population-wide epidemiological demographic model to assess the potential macroeconomic impact of 
COVID-19, together with policies to mitigate or suppress the pandemic by means of home quarantine, school 
closures, social distancing and accompanying business closures. 
Our simulations indicate that, assuming a clinical attack rate of 48% and a case fatality ratio of 1.5%, COVID- 
19 alone would impose a direct health-related economic burden of £39.6bn (1.73% of GDP) on the UK economy. 
Mitigation strategies imposed for 12 weeks reduce case fatalities by 29%, but the total cost to the economy is 
£308bn (13.5% of GDP); £66bn (2.9% of GDP) of which is attributable to labour lost from working parents 
during school closures, and £201bn (8.8% of GDP) of which is attributable to business closures. Suppressing the 
pandemic over a longer period of time may reduce deaths by 95%, but the total cost to the UK economy also 
increases to £668bn (29.2% of GDP), where £166bn (7.3% of GDP) is attributable to school closures and 502bn 
(21.9% of GDP) to business closures. 
Our analyses suggest Covid-19 has the potential to impose unprecedented economic costs on the UK economy, 
and whilst public actions are necessary to minimise mortality, the duration of school and business closures are 
key to determining the economic cost. The initial economic support package promised by the UK government 
may be proportionate to the costs of mitigating Covid-19, but without alternative measures to reduce the scale 
and duration of school and business closures, the economic support may be insufficient to compensate for longer 
term suppression of the pandemic which could generate an even greater health impact through major recession.   
1. Introduction 
1.1. The current outbreak 
Since the outbreak of Covid-19 in Wuhan City, Hubei Province, 
China in December 2019 (WHO, 2020), its rapid spread has transformed 
lives and behaviour globally. Covid-19 is the third major outbreak of a 
novel coronavirus in the 21st century, following SARS in 2003 and 
MERS in 2012. However, whilst these previous outbreaks demonstrated 
the potential seriousness of an infectious disease outbreak to bring tragic 
impacts on population health, along with serious repercussions for the 
economies affected (Keogh-Brown & Smith, 2008; Noy & Shields, 2019), 
Covid-19 has transformed the approach of policymakers and invoked 
unprecedented advice, legislation and influence on the lives of in-
dividuals, businesses and organisations. For example, previous out-
breaks highlighted the need for policymakers to minimise individual 
avoidance actions, since they may impose substantial economic costs 
whilst not necessarily reducing transmission (Smith, 2006). However, 
the high mortality from Covid-19 has taken the responsibility for 
avoidance behaviour away from individuals by imposing extreme na-
tional packages of social distancing and business closures which pri-
oritise reductions in transmission and mortality from the disease, rather 
than the potentially substantial economic impacts that may result. 
Whilst the future path of the pandemic cannot be precisely known, 
* Corresponding author. 
E-mail address: rich.smith@exeter.ac.uk (R.D. Smith).  
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect 
SSM - Population Health 
journal homepage: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ssmph 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssmph.2020.100651 
Received 18 April 2020; Received in revised form 7 August 2020; Accepted 18 August 2020   
SSM - Population Health 12 (2020) 100651
2
epidemiological models have been constructed to predict both the 
spread of Covid-19 and the expected efficacy of non-pharmaceutical 
behavioural interventions to mitigate or suppress that spread (Fergu-
son, Laydon et al., 2020) and the UK government’s actions, in particular, 
have followed the evidence presented in the mathematical modelling 
studies closely (Hamzelou, 2020). However, there have been no equiv-
alent economic models to assess the economic impact of the policies 
imposed by governments to reduce transmission and mortality from 
Covid-19. Due to the high level of reliance, of the UK government, on 
well-documented scientific advice, the UK epidemic presents an ideal 
context for an estimation of both the macroeconomic impact of Covid-19 
and the impact of non-pharmaceutical behavioural interventions to 
combat it. 
1.2. The economics of previous pandemics 
Previous evidence indicates that there are multiple direct and indi-
rect channels whereby Covid-19 could affect the UK economy. Infectious 
disease outbreaks have impacts on labour supply and productivity across 
sectors through the reduction in work time of workers who are infected 
or time losses by carers. However, the SARS outbreak in 2003 demon-
strated that the indirect costs of an infectious disease outbreak can easily 
exceed the direct productivity costs, as a result of behavioural changes 
motivated either by advice from national and international bodies or by 
the public’s fear-driven response to the outbreak (APEC, 2004). In Bei-
jing, the estimated $1.4billion indirect costs of SARS to the tourism 
sector were shown to be 300 times that of the direct medical costs to the 
city (Beutels, Jia et al., 2009), and, in Hong Kong, the decline in do-
mestic consumption combined with a decrease in tourist spending due to 
SARS contributed to high levels of unemployment which reached 8.7% 
in July 2003 (Siu & Wong, 2004). SARS was also blamed for declines in 
the Hong Kong hospitality industry where 1600 restaurant staff became 
unemployed and a further 16,000 staff were forced to take leave or pay 
cuts (Lee & Warner, 2005). Other studies have highlighted the economic 
impact of the spillover effects of SARS within China and with other 
countries including Malaysia, Canada, Australia and Singapore 
(Keogh-Brown & Smith, 2008), mainly related to the tourism sector. 
In view of the multi-faceted multi-sectoral impact of infectious dis-
ease outbreaks on national economies, the standard “cost of illness” 
approach to measuring the economic impacts of disease are ill-equipped 
to perform economic assessments of the full impact of infectious disease 
outbreaks (Beutels, Edmunds et al., 2008; Brahmbhatt & Dutta, 2008). 
Furthermore, previous research has highlighted more generally that, 
since the scale and range of public health emergencies of international 
concern are sufficient to perturb the general economy, general equilib-
rium methods, rather than traditional (partial equilibrium) forms of 
health economic evaluation should be used for analysing their effects 
(Beutels, Edmunds et al., 2008). In line with this recommendation, this 
study applies a macroeconomic Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) 
model to assess the macroeconomic burden of the current Covid-19 
pandemic on the UK economy. 
1.3. The macro-economics of potential pandemics 
Whilst the previous SARS and MERS coronavirus outbreaks did not 
have a significant economic impact on the UK, macroeconomic simu-
lations of the impact of infectious disease outbreaks were produced 
around 10 years ago, in the context of a UK flu pandemic, to estimate the 
potential impact of avoidance behaviour and government policies to 
reduce disease transmission (Keogh-Brown, Wren-Lewis, et al., 2010; 
Smith, Keogh-Brown et al., 2009; Smith, Keogh-Brown et al., 2011). 
These macroeconomic simulations captured the direct and indirect 
economic impact of a potential pandemic together with school closures 
and short-term prophylactic absence from work to avoid infection. The 
results indicated that, depending on the severity of the pandemic, if 30% 
of the workforce were to absent themselves from work to avoid infection 
and if schools closed for 13 weeks, these indirect economic impacts 
could exceed direct health-related economic impacts by a factor of 10. 
However, although the disease and policy scenarios were considered 
somewhat extreme when they were first published, they are likely to fall 
far short of the impact of the national instructions and regulations 
concerning social distancing which are currently being applied in the UK 
for Covid-19. It is the purpose of this study, therefore, to produce current 
estimates of the potential direct and indirect economic impact of the 
Covid-19 outbreak on the UK economy which capture both the direct 
health economic impacts and the potential impacts of current measures 
to either mitigate or suppress epidemic growth. 
2. Materials and methods: A whole-economy approach 
This study uses a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model in 
order to provide a full analysis of the potential macroeconomic impact of 
the Covid-19 outbreak and associated policies to the UK. CGE models are 
multi-sectoral models of the whole economy which have been used 
extensively in macroeconomic health policy analysis including previous 
applications to pandemic influenza (Keogh-Brown, Smith, et al., 2010; 
Smith, Keogh-Brown et al., 2009; Smith, Keogh-Brown et al., 2011) and 
SARS (Lee & McKibbin, 2012). CGE models are flexible and can be used 
to simultaneously estimate direct and indirect impacts of health on la-
bour supply, health costs on government budgets and consumption 
impacts on specific sectors (WHO, 2009). In addition, multi-sectoral 
CGE models have the capacity to undertake broader macroeconomic 
policy analyses, and capture behaviour changes for firms and con-
sumers, beyond the health sector, and therefore our UK model is ideally 
suited to analysing the combined UK economic impact of the UK 
Covid-19 pandemic burden and related UK mitigation and suppression 
policy-initiatives. 
CGE models arrive at their outputs by capturing the behaviour of 
different economic agents in the economy. There are four main eco-
nomic agents: firms, consumers, government, and foreign agents. Firms 
seek to combine resource inputs to maximise profits, consumers allocate 
their disposable income between consumption and savings so as to 
maximise welfare, the government levies taxes, distributes benefits, and 
purchases goods directly, while foreign agents interact with domestic 
agents through goods trade (imports/exports), international factor in-
come flows, foreign unrequited transfers and foreign borrowing and 
lending. The behaviour of the different agents is based on economic 
theory and is specified mathematically as a system of equations which is 
solved simultaneously. The model includes multiple production sectors 
and goods markets, and it also has a government budget which allows 
for capturing of publicly funded health costs. The model used is the 
IFPRI standard CGE model (Löfgren, Lee Harris et al., 2001). The 
equations for this comparative static model are calibrated using eco-
nomic data, a social accounting matrix (SAM), which, for the purposes of 
this analysis, is based on the 2015 Supply-Use tables produced by the 
Office for National Statistics (ONS, 2017) and the model is run forward 
from the base year, 2015, by targeting key macroeconomic aggregates 
(WB, 2019) (nominal and real GDP) over the period 2015–2020 such 
that the model reflects the UK economy for the year of the Covid-19 
outbreak. 
Linked to the standard CGE model is a simple epidemiological de-
mographic model of the UK population based on UN population pro-
jections (UN DESA 2019), and with the capacity to calculate clinical 
outcomes via application of epidemiological parameters including 
clinical attack rates (CARs), case fatality rates (CFRs), hospitalisation 
rates, and intensive care unit (ICU) rates. Since the majority of our 
scenario estimates relating to Covid-19 transmission and its health ef-
fects are expressed as percentages, the demographic model is used to 
translate those percentages to numbers of symptomatic cases, hospital-
isations and deaths. These are used, together with unit costs, to estimate 
health sector costs which will be borne by the government budget in the 
model. In addition to the health costs, absenteeism time losses are 
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estimated for patients and caregivers. These are adjusted by age-specific 
labour force participation rates to calculate labour supply reductions in 
the model. For each modelling scenario, the model calculates the health- 
and care-related productivity impacts, health sector costs and also 
health and care effects on population demographics. More detailed 
specifications of our direct health impact simulations are provided 
below. 
The detailed specification of production and consumption sectors 
and inclusion of imports and exports also allows the model to capture 
the effects of indirect responses to the pandemic and these are also 
outlined in our specification of modelling scenarios. 
The static CGE model used in this study is solved for two equilibrium 
solutions. The ‘initial baseline’ equilibrium solution reflects a scenario 
which is the state of the world in 2020 if Covid-19 had not occurred. The 
model is then shocked to reflect a new state of the world, including the 
Covid-19 event, and a new ‘C19 baseline’ equilibrium solution is found. 
Comparison of the two gives the impact of the scenario of Covid-19. 
More scenarios can then be added with various levels of mitigation 
and suppression effects and including individual behaviour changes 
and/or policy initiatives such as social distancing and school closures. 
The policy shocks can take various forms in order to reflect the direct 
and indirect effects of Covid-19 on the UK economy. For example, direct 
health-related time losses of employed Covid-patients are imposed on 
the model as economy-wide reductions in labour supply and the 
accompanying health sector costs are imposed on the government 
budget. Indirect policy responses such as business closures can be 
mirrored by reductions in labour and capital supply in specific sectors 
(which reduces production by those sectors and limits their output). 
School closures can be simulated as economy-wide reductions in labour 
supply by those who care for dependent children. Policy shocks can be 
applied together, in order to estimate the combined impact of direct and 
indirect impacts, or they can be imposed in isolation to decompose the 
impacts of specific elements of the policy shocks. The modelling sce-
narios are outlined in the following subsections. 
2.1. Modelling scenarios 
As with any emerging infectious disease outbreak there is consider-
able uncertainty surrounding the current Covid-19 outbreak. However, 
predictive modelling of the Covid-19 epidemic in the UK has been 
conducted by the Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team (Ferguson, 
Laydon et al., 2020) and this model has also predicted the efficacy of 
non-pharmaceutical interventions to mitigate or suppress epidemic 
spread. Furthermore, the UK government response to Covid-19 appears 
to be closely following the type and timing of the policies recommended 
by the Imperial modelers. The modelling document therefore provides 
an ideal base from which to produce realistic UK economic simulations 
in an otherwise very unpredictable situation. Based on the Imperial 
paper, we model three main scenarios: direct health impacts, pandemic 
mitigation to slow the spread of the epidemic and suppression to reduce 
and maintain lower levels of transmission and reduce fatalities. 
Parameter estimates for all of our modelling scenarios are given in 
Tables A1.1-A1.3 in appendix A and discussed in sections 2.1.1-2.1.3, 
but the key epidemiological and health-related assumptions are outlined 
in section 2.1.1 below.Where parameters cannot be supplied by the 
Imperial modelling study, alternative sources relating to Covid-19, 
previous knowledge of the SARS and influenza outbreaks, and pre-
dictions from pandemic planning documents, are used. In addition, we 
also employ sensitivity scenarios which vary key parameters in order to 
capture the potential uncertainty of our estimates. 
2.1.1. Scenario 1: Direct health costs and effects only 
In order to estimate the direct economic impacts of Covid-19 on the 
UK economy we parameterise the health-related reductions in labour 
supply due to the disease and the associated health costs. Various pa-
rameters are required in order to distinguish between morbidity effects 
of differing severity and duration, including, for example, hospital-
isations and admissions to intensive care units, and also mortality 
impacts. 
The following parameters are based on the Imperial model of the UK 
Covid-19 epidemic (Ferguson, Laydon et al., 2020). The CAR is a key 
parameter and expresses the proportion of people who suffer symp-
tomatic illness. We assume a basic reproductive rate (R0) of 2.4 and that 
40% of cases are asymptomatic which yields a CAR of 49%. Recent 
evidence indicates that the number of clinically confirmed cases of 
Covid-19 in China varies by age (Zhonghua et al., 2020) and dis-
tinguishing clinical effects by age is important in our economic model 
since health-related labour supply effects only apply to those of working 
age and costs of ICU treatment differ between children and adults. Since 
the Imperial study does not provide age specific CARs for the UK pop-
ulation we used the Chinese population based estimates (Verity, Okell 
et al., 2020) to distribute infections by age. In a similar way, we used the 
Imperial model’s age-specific conversions of Chinese hospitalisations, 
ICU admissions and deaths (Verity, Okell et al., 2020). which have been 
scaled to apply to the UK population (Ferguson, Laydon et al., 2020). 
The CFR is the case fatality rate for symptomatic cases. Specifically, we 
adopted the Imperial model’s aggregate population-weighted infection 
fatality ratio (IFR) of 0.9%, which implies an aggregate CFR of 1.5%. In a 
similar way, we calculated age-specific CFRs, based on the Imperial 
model’s age-specific IFRs, and we interpret the difference between 
implied case fatalities, based on the aggregate and age-specific rates, as a 
measure of case fatalities outside hospitals. Furthermore, we adopted 
age-specific hospitalisation rates and age-specific ICU rates from the 
imperial study (this amounts to assuming that a population-weighted 
average of 4.4% of symptomatic cases require hospitalisation and 30% 
of hospitalised cases are admitted to intensive care). For sensitivity 
analysis a ±50% change in the CAR, CFR, hospitalisation and ICU 
admission rates are assumed. Finally, our economic modelling scenarios 
assume that ICU costs for children apply to those aged 0 to 14, and adult 
costs apply from age 15, working age is assumed to be 15 to 64, those 
aged 65 and above are assumed to be retired and so do not contribute 
labour to the economy. 
Illness duration is used to estimate the duration of absence from work 
and consequent loss of labour from Covid-19. For symptomatic non- 
hospitalised cases we assume individuals will take 7 days of absence 
from work in accordance with assumptions for illness duration without 
complications from pandemic flu (Cabinet Office, 2013). Our assump-
tions for work absence for hospitalised patients are based on illness 
duration estimates from the Imperial model and assume an additional 
week of absence following hospitalisation before those who recover can 
return to work. For standard hospitalisations we assume 5 days of onset 
and 8 days of hospitalisation which, including the week for recovery 
implies 15 days of work absenteeism, while for ICU admissions we as-
sume 5 days of onset, 6 days of standard hospitalisation and 10 days in 
ICU which, after recovery, implies a conservative 20 days of work 
absenteeism (the durations of hospitalisation and ICU care are also used 
for health cost estimation of both ICU and non-ICU cases). Costs per case 
for hospital and ICU treatment are taken from the literature (Baguelin, 
Hoek et al., 2010; OpenDataNI (2018)) and are provided in the appen-
dices. For fatal cases of Covid-19 in working age individuals we assume a 
conservative loss, in 2020, of 6 months of labour in accordance with 
previously published replacement costs for employee departures but 
excluding the loss of future lifetime earnings. 
In order to calculate Covid-19 related losses of productive labour 
supply from employed individuals, rates for symptomatic, hospitalised, 
ICU and fatal cases are multiplied by absenteeism duration to form work 
time loss estimates for working age individuals. These are multiplied by 
gender-specific labour force participation rates in order to calculate the 
reductions in labour supply due to Covid-19. This enables the simulation 
of reductions in productive labour supply to be calculated and presented 
as part of a holistic set of outputs. Estimates of hospitalisation and ICU 
admission costs are applied across age groups for the durations specified 
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above. In addition, we make the conservative assumption that no 
employed caregivers will take time from their work in order to care for 
infected relatives/friends. Tables showing all the health-related shocks, 
which are used as inputs to the CGE model, including symptomatic 
cases, hospitalisations, deaths, time loss estimates and health system 
costs are included in appendices 2–4. 
2.1.2. Scenario 2: Direct health effects with pandemic mitigation 
In addition to the direct health effects of an infectious disease 
outbreak, indirect effects from preventive actions in order to avoid 
infection are also an important consideration (Sadique, Edmunds et al., 
2007; Smith, 2006). These may be provoked either by the responses of 
individuals or individual organisations to the outbreak or by nationally 
orchestrated policy advice. In the case of the current covid-19 pandemic 
in the UK individual preventive actions have been superseded in favour 
of stringent national policies of social distancing. These policies broadly 
follow the specifications outlined by the Imperial College COVID-19 
Response Team’s modelling and our second modelling scenario com-
bines the direct health impacts described above with a policy of miti-
gation which “focuses on slowing but not necessarily stopping epidemic 
spread reducing peak healthcare demand while protecting those most at 
risk of severe disease from infection” (Ferguson, Laydon et al., 2020). 
The mitigation policy package described in the Imperial modelling 
paper is similar to the package of advice from the UK government which 
is being applied to the current pandemic. This consists of household 
quarantine for 14 days when an individual within a household is 
affected, shielding of those over 70 years of age, social distancing of the 
entire population, and closure of schools and universities. Case isolation 
for seven days is also mentioned but we assume this will not increase 
labour supply losses on top of those included within the 14 day home 
quarantine. 
In terms of the economic modelling, this mitigation policy package is 
captured as follows. Home quarantine for 14 days is reflected in a 
change in the assumption of work absence for infected cases from seven 
working days to 10 working days (two weeks). Shielding for those aged 
over 70 does not affect labour supply since workers are assumed to be 
aged 15 to 64, but the impact of this policy to reduce deaths, in com-
bination with the other elements, is incorporated in our assumptions for 
changes in the CFR. When modelling social distancing of the working 
population, we assume that, as outlined in the current UK government 
advice, workers will be encouraged only to engage in essential work and 
to work from home where possible. While central to the assessment of 
mitigation and suppression interventions, the impact of this advice is 
difficult to quantify. We assume that it will invoke substantial business 
closures in non-essential sectors and that, as exhibited in the current UK 
situation (Cabinet Office, 2020), the supply of tourism related sectors 
such as hotels and restaurants and recreation and entertainment sectors 
will be drastically reduced. We model this supply-side shock as a 90% 
reduction in labour and capital factor employment in hotels and 
restaurant and entertainment/recreation sectors, and a 50% reduction 
in labour and capital factor employment in remaining non-essential 
sectors (where non-essential are defined in the appendix). Whilst esti-
mates are not available for compliance with government advice on 
business closures, the latter assumption is consistent with the assump-
tion of 50% reduction in workplace contacts assumed in the Imperial 
model (Ferguson, Laydon et al., 2020). 
School closures would normally require working parents who are 
responsible for dependent children to find care arrangements for their 
children or take time off work if they are unable to make alternative care 
arrangements. However, in the case of Covid-19, the social distancing 
measures will prevent grandparents, relatives or friends outside a 
household from providing care to children causing working parents to 
take time off work to care for (and, possibly, educate) their children. 
Precise estimates for the effect of school closure on working parents in 
the UK, or estimates of the impact on working parents who try to educate 
their children at home whilst working, is not available. One Australian 
study found that 53.4% of parents had to take time off work to care for 
children with flu (Willis, Preen et al., 2019). According to national 
statistics, the number of employed women with dependent children was 
74% in 2017 (ONS, 2020). We assume 68% of these working mothers 
will take time off work for the duration of school closures, and thereby 
that 50% of all UK mothers take time off work. 
Preventive actions in response to infectious disease outbreaks are 
highly unpredictable. Whilst they may be driven by the severity of a 
pandemic and the fear associated with the number of infections and 
deaths that result, they may also be influenced by the media (Pickles & 
Goodwin, 2006; Washer, 2004). However, for the mitigation scenario, 
the business closures and school-closure related absences described 
above are assumed to be applied for 12 weeks, as prescribed by the 
Imperial mitigation scenario. 
The impact of the mitigation scenario, as estimated by the Imperial 
model, is assumed to be a flattening of the epidemic curve reducing 
overall deaths by 29%. This is captured in the economic model by 
adjusting the overall and age-adjusted CFR rates. 
2.1.3. Scenario 3: Direct health effects with pandemic suppression 
In contrast to the mitigation scenario which applies a package of 
interventions for 12 weeks to slow but not stop epidemic spread, the 
suppression scenario specified by the imperial model aims to reverse 
epidemic growth by applying and releasing the package of interventions 
indefinitely, to ensure the recurring peaks of the disease continue to 
remain at manageable levels. The policy interventions for suppression 
remain the same as the mitigation interventions: 14 days of household 
quarantine for symptomatic individuals, social distancing across the 
population and closure of schools and universities. However, based on 
the Imperial model, the business and school closure measures, which 
were applied on 23rd March, are assumed to continue for 74% of the 
time from implementation until end-of-2020 (and beyond, but we only 
simulate until end-of-2020). This implies that closures will continue for 
207 days or slightly less than seven months during 2020. The impact of 
the suppression interventions is, in line with the Imperial model, 
assumed to reduce the overall and age-adjusted CFR rates by 95% and 
this will again be captured in the economic model adjusting health- 
related shocks to the changes in fatality rates. 
3. Results 
A complete set of our computed health- and mitigation/suppression 
scenario-related shocks to the UK economy, derived from our Covid-19 
assumptions outlined under scenarios 1–3, are presented in appendices 
2–4, but our central scenario inputs of the main health effects for the 
Table 1 
Clinical health impacts - C19 baseline, Mitigation, and Suppression scenarios 
(number of patient cases).   
C19 baseline Mitigation Suppression 
Symptomatic Infections 32,685,705 32,685,705 32,685,705 
Total Fatalities 490,286 348,103 24,272 
- hospitalised 438,789 311,540 21,723 
- non-hospitalised 51,496 36,562 2549 
Hospitalised 3,285,781 3,285,781 3,285,781 
- ICU 907,027 907,027 907,027 
- non-ICU 2,378,754 2,378,754 2,378,754 
Symptomatic (not 
hospitalised) 
29,399,924.29 29,399,924 29,399,924  
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three scenarios are summarised in Table 11 The summarised numbers 
indicate that, if no action is taken to mitigate the virus spread (‘C19 
baseline’ scenario), the direct health effects of Covid-19 outbreak in the 
UK could result in over 30 million symptomatic cases, 3.3 million hos-
pitalisations, 900,000 ICU admissions and almost half a million hospi-
talised and non-hospitalised case fatalities (which is within 5% of the 
value presented in the underlying epidemiological study (Ferguson, 
Laydon et al., 2020). The vast majority (25.3 million, see appendix 2) of 
non-hospitalised cases are assumed to be amongst prime age adults, but 
our assumptions indicate that around 70% of deaths (358,000, see ap-
pendix 2) will occur in elderly age groups. 
3.1. Direct health-related economic burden 
Economic impacts of the C19 baseline scenario simulation (scenario 
1) are shown in Table 2. The total direct economic burden from Covid-19 
in the UK, measured by changes in real GDP, is just over £39.6bn or 
1.73% of GDP. Decomposition of these effects indicates that just £0.7bn 
(0.03%) of the health-related economic impact on real GDP is attribut-
able to hospital costs which are primarily made up from ICU patient 
admissions (£0.6bn). The real government consumption figures show 
that hospital costs imposed by Covid-19 (£8.9bn increase in government 
consumption) are more substantial than reflected in the GDP figures,2 
but since government consumption is funded by taxation, the additional 
healthcare funding required in the model is primarily drawn from pri-
vate consumption channels and, whilst it will place a significant burden 
on households’ welfare via increased taxation and decreased consump-
tion (-£40.5bn or 2.7% as shown in Table 2), the isolated impact of 
increased health costs on GDP overall is likely to be small. 
The large health-related impact on GDP is mainly attributable to 
health-related labour supply losses of £38.9bn. The vast majority of 
these economic losses (£30.8bn) are due to work absence from non- 
hospitalised cases, which is not surprising since nearly 70% of symp-
tomatic Covid-19 cases are assumed to occur in working age individuals 
who will not require hospitalisation. The economic cost of hospitalised 
but recovered patients on GDP is estimated to be £4.7bn while the 
economic cost of lost labour from fatalities in the labour force amount to 
£2.8bn. In practice these health-related costs cannot be isolated from the 
broader indirect economic impacts and do not capture the substantial 
loss of life which occurs from the 358,000 deaths (not shown) that are 
assumed to occur outside the workforce. 
3.2. Mitigation scenario economic burden 
The total economic impact of the mitigation scenario is presented in 
Table 3 and, including both direct health-related economic costs and 
public prevention related costs, it amounts to £308bn or 13.5% of GDP. 
These impacts represent a potentially unprecedented loss to the UK 
economy in a single year and includes a private household welfare loss 
of 15.1% or £261.2bn measured by consumption (equivalent variation 
= -£261.4bn). Government consumption is also expected to reduce by 
£14.7bn (3.3%). Under the mitigation strategy, the direct health-related 
economic burden increases by a third to £53.1bn (2.3% of GDP). The 
change in the health-related economic burden derives from an increased 
loss of labour under the mitigation strategy compared with the direct 
health-related burden simulation. Under mitigation, the number of 
working age deaths reduce, decreasing the economic losses due to fa-
talities from £2.8bn at baseline to £2.0bn. The reduction in deaths 
amongst working age individuals increases the number of hospitalised 
recovered patients who return to work but this increase in the number of 
individuals who are hospitalised and recover results in an increase from 
£4.7bn to £4.9bn in the costs from labour lost amongst hospitalised 
survivors. The largest contributor to the increased economic burden 
from direct health effects derives from non-hospitalised recovered pa-
tients who, under the mitigation scenario’s quarantine rules take a 
longer absence from work (two weeks) compared with the baseline 
assumption of seven working days. This increases economic time loss 
estimates for non-hospitalised recovered individuals from £30.8bn to 
£44.8bn. The hospital costs under the mitigation scenario are un-
changed since, although deaths are reduced, we assume no difference in 
the duration of hospitalisation and ICU treatment between fatal and 
non-fatal cases. 
However, the economic burden from the mitigation scenario is 
dominated by the non-health related policy impacts which total 
£264.1bn or 11.4% of GDP. These costs include labour supply reductions 
attributable to 12 weeks of school closure (£66.1bn) which, by itself, 
exceeds the direct health-related burden. Domestic business closures in 
non-essential sectors is the largest single contributor at £200.9bn (8.8% 
of GDP), and this includes substantial losses for recreation services 
(£17.3bn) and hotels and restaurants (£38.5bn). In terms of the popu-
lation health benefits, the mitigation policies are estimated to reduce the 
number of Covid-19 UK deaths by almost one third (saving just over 
142,000 lives). 
3.3. Suppression scenario economic burden 
The total macroeconomic cost of the public Suppression scenario is 
presented in Table 4 and amounts to £668.4bn. This is almost one third 
(29.2%) of UK GDP for the year of 2020 and it includes a private 
household welfare loss of 30.0% or £450.0bn measured by consumption 
(equivalent variation = -£451.2bn). A reduction in government con-
sumption of £73.4bn (16.7%) is also estimated. The direct health-related 
macroeconomic burden of £51.4bn contributes just 8% of the total 
economic impact and is slightly smaller than the equivalent £53.1bn 
impact for the mitigation scenario. The direct health-related macro-
economic impacts relating to suppression are a little smaller than for the 
mitigation scenario since the suppression scenario assumes there will be 
a reduction in deaths but no reductions in the number of symptomatic 
cases, hospitalisations or ICU admissions. Therefore the health-related 
economic impacts for hospitalised fatalities for suppression (£0.1bn) 
are smaller than for mitigation (£2.0bn), but economic impacts for 
recovered hospitalisations increase slightly from £4.9bn for mitigation 
to £5.2bn for suppression. Since we assume no difference in the duration 
of hospitalisation and ICU treatment between fatal and non-fatal cases, 
the hospitalisation costs of suppression are the same as for the mitigation 
and disease only scenarios. 
However, the direct health impacts are dwarfed by the £632.9bn of 
economic losses to GDP from the public prevention interventions. The 
longer school closures under the suppression scenario impose an impact 
on UK GDP of £166.2bn, losses from the closures in the recreational 
sector contribute a further £44.3bn, hotels and restaurant closures 
contribute £99.5bn and closures of remaining non-essential businesses 
makes the largest contribution: £386.6bn loss to GDP. 
Relative sector-level production changes are illustrated in Fig. 1, and 
they underline the sharp drop in sector-level activity following from the 
Suppression scenario. Hotels and restaurant services, and recreational 
activities, drop by an annualised 54.4%, while processed food sectors 
are much less affected (− 9.5%) and Fisheries are least affected (− 3.9%) 
due to high and persistent exports. While the agricultural production 
decline (− 21.9%) is less than the overall average (− 27.9%), it represents 
a remarkable demand side shock following from a collapse in non- 
1 The decomposition of results presented in Tables 2–4 and the appendices 
are produced from individual simulations of the scenarios described in the first 
column. Since combining scenarios produces interaction effects in the CGE 
model, the impacts attributed to the sum of isolated scenarios does not neces-
sarily match the combined impacts exactly.  
2 The health system treatment costs for Covid-19 are even higher at £43.0bn 
(see appendix 2), but reduced activity in other parts of the health system, and a 
general decline in government revenues, limits the expansion of health and 
general government spending. 
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Table 2 













Total health-related costs ¡39.6 ¡1.73% ¡40.5 ¡2.70% 8.5 1.93% 
- Hospital Costs, total ¡0.7 ¡0.03% ¡7.6 ¡0.50% 8.9 2.02% 
- hospitalised fatalities − 0.3 − 0.01% − 4.5 − 0.30% 5.3 1.20% 
- hospitalised recovered 
ICU 
− 0.3 − 0.01% − 4.3 − 0.29% 5.0 1.14% 
- hospitalised recovered 
non-ICU 
− 0.1 0.00% − 1.4 − 0.09% 1.5 0.35% 
- Labour supply losses, 
total 
¡38.9 ¡1.70% ¡31.7 ¡2.11% ¡2.1 ¡0.48% 
- hospitalised fatalities − 2.8 − 0.12% − 2.3 − 0.15% − 0.1 − 0.03% 
- hospitalised recovered − 4.7 − 0.21% − 3.9 − 0.26% − 0.2 − 0.05% 
- non-hospitalised 
recovered 
− 30.8 − 1.35% − 25.3 − 1.68% − 1.6 − 0.37%  
Table 3 













Total health and prevention- 
related costs 
¡308.0 ¡13.5% ¡226.2 ¡15.1% ¡14.7 ¡3.3% 
Total health-related costs ¡53.1 ¡2.3% ¡51.8 ¡3.5% 8.6 1.9% 
- Hospital Costs, total ¡0.7 0.0% ¡7.6 ¡0.5% 8.9 2.0% 
- hospitalised intensive-care − 0.3 0.0% − 4.5 − 0.3% 5.3 1.2% 
- hospitalised non-intensive-care − 0.3 0.0% − 4.3 − 0.3% 5.0 1.1% 
- Labour supply losses, total ¡52.4 ¡2.3% ¡42.2 ¡2.8% ¡3.0 ¡0.7% 
- hospitalised fatalities − 2.0 − 0.1% − 1.6 − 0.1% − 0.1 0.0% 
- hospitalised recovered − 4.9 − 0.2% − 4.1 − 0.3% − 0.2 − 0.1% 
- non-hospitalised recovered − 44.8 − 2.0% − 36.3 − 2.4% − 2.5 − 0.6% 
Total public prevention-related 
costs 
¡261.4 ¡11.4% ¡172.6 ¡11.5% ¡31.2 ¡7.1% 
- School closures ¡66.1 ¡2.9% ¡37.5 ¡2.5% ¡16.4 ¡3.7% 
- labour supply losses, caregivers − 66.1 − 2.9% − 37.5 − 2.5% − 16.4 − 3.7% 
- Business closures ¡200.9 ¡8.8% ¡138.0 ¡9.2% ¡16.2 ¡3.7% 
- domestic business closures - other 
non-essential 
− 154.8 − 6.8% − 101.2 − 6.7% − 11.6 − 2.6% 
- recreational services sector − 17.3 − 0.8% − 14.5 − 1.0% − 0.9 − 0.2% 
- hotels & restaurants sector − 38.5 − 1.7% − 32.3 − 2.2% − 2.0 − 0.5%  
Table 4 













Total health and prevention-related 
costs 
¡668.4 ¡29.2% ¡450.0 ¡30.0% ¡73.4 ¡16.7% 
Total health-related costs ¡51.4 ¡2.2% ¡50.4 ¡3.4% 8.6 1.9% 
- Hospital Costs, total ¡0.7 0.0% ¡7.6 ¡0.5% 8.9 2.0% 
- hospitalised intensive-care − 0.3 0.0% − 4.5 − 0.3% 5.3 1.2% 
- hospitalised non-intensive-care − 0.3 0.0% − 4.3 − 0.3% 5.0 1.1% 
- Labour supply losses, total ¡50.7 ¡2.2% ¡40.9 ¡2.7% ¡2.9 ¡0.7% 
- hospitalised fatalities − 0.1 0.0% − 0.1 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 
- hospitalised recovered − 5.2 − 0.2% − 4.3 − 0.3% − 0.2 − 0.1% 
- non-hospitalised recovered − 44.8 − 2.0% − 36.3 − 2.4% − 2.5 − 0.6% 
Total public prevention-related costs ¡632.9 ¡27.7% ¡402.5 ¡26.8% ¡93.6 ¡21.2% 
- School closures ¡166.2 ¡7.3% ¡94.0 ¡6.3% ¡41.1 ¡9.3% 
- labour supply losses, caregivers − 166.2 − 7.3% − 94.0 − 6.3% − 41.1 − 9.3% 
- Business closures ¡501.5 ¡21.9% ¡325.2 ¡21.7% ¡62.6 ¡14.2% 
- domestic business closures - other 
non-essential 
− 386.6 − 16.9% − 244.4 − 16.3% − 43.9 − 10.0% 
- recreational services sector − 44.3 − 1.9% − 36.7 − 2.4% − 2.7 − 0.6% 
- hotels & restaurants sector − 95.5 − 4.2% − 77.1 − 5.1% − 5.8 − 1.3%  
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agricultural value added creation. 
3.4. Sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity analyses of key disease parameters was employed to 
illustrate the potential variations in our results due to uncertainty. 
Tables of sensitivity analysis results are presented for all three scenarios 
in appendix 5 and direct health impacts are shown in Fig. 2. For each 
sensitivity analysis, the parameter concerned is decreased or increased 
by 50% to give an upper or lower limit value. For the C19 baseline 
scenario, our results indicate that respectively lowering and increasing 
the clinical attack rate, from our central 48% value, changes the direct 
health-related economic burden to respectively £19.3bn and £61.1bn 
(±51–54%), and this is the epidemiological parameter to which the 
economic impacts are most sensitive. Lowering and increasing the 
overall and age-specific case fatality rates changes the economic burden 
to £38.3bn and £40.8bn (±3%), which shows the insensitivity of our 
economic impacts to the fatality ratio, primarily because most of the 
deaths occur amongst elderly non-workers and our assumptions of the 
ICU treatment duration do not alter if a case proves to be fatal. Similarly, 
Fig. 1. Sector-level output changes – public Suppression scenario (%).  
Fig. 2. Sensitivity analyses of Baseline, Mitigation, and Suppression scenario Economic Health Burdens.  
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variations in our age-specific hospitalisation rates have a relatively small 
impact changing the economic burden to £36.5bn and £43.1bn 
(±7–8%). This is because varying the number of hospitalised working 
age individuals by approximately 900,000 makes a relatively small 
difference in terms of work time losses compared with the more than 25 
million other symptomatic non-hospitalised individuals. Finally, vary-
ing age-specific ICU admission rates also has a small effect on our eco-
nomic burden estimates, changing the economic burden estimates to 
£38.0bn and £41.2bn (±4%). This variation is small because ICU cases 
contribute little to the overall health related economic burden. The 
patterns of variations for the mitigation and suppression scenarios are 
similar to the C19 baseline scenario sensitivity results. As mentioned in 
Sections 3.2-3.3, the health-related economic impacts for the mitigation 
scenario are the largest, followed by the health-related suppression 
impacts. Nonetheless, the relative sensitivity, of these scenarios, to 
variation in epidemiological parameters, is very close to the relative 
sensitivity of the C19 baseline results implying that variation in CAR 
rates changes the direct health-related economic burden by ±52–56% 
while other impacts are within ±10%. 
4. Discussion 
Our simulations show that the economic impact of Covid-19 is likely 
to be dominated by the public prevention measures rather than the 
direct health costs of the disease. With any modelling study, the accu-
racy and appropriateness of the results hinge upon the accuracy of the 
parameters used in the model and modelling scenarios regardless of the 
quality and appropriateness of the model itself. In the case of the current 
Covid-19 outbreak, uncertainty still exists regarding the future pro-
gression of the disease, its clinical effects, the extent and duration of the 
government-imposed responses to mitigate the disease, and the efficacy 
of those responses to mitigate the disease. As such, the specific values of 
economic impact which have been estimated in this modelling study 
cannot be stated with certainty, but we have designed our simulations to 
reflect current UK estimates of both the disease burden and measures to 
mitigate or suppress it. We have also allowed for uncertainty by 
including upper and lower estimates of key transmission and fatality 
parameters such that our simulations cover a broad range of outbreak 
severity which, it is reasonable to assume, will cover the possibilities for 
a significant Covid-19 pandemic in the UK. However, although our es-
timates may not simulate the economic impact of Covid-19 with abso-
lute precision, they do illustrate the relative importance of the type and 
duration of public prevention measures which, though necessary in 
order to reduce mortality, have significant economic impacts. Further-
more, our three month mitigation scenario results which predict a 
13.5% loss to GDP agree with the recent analysis by UKs Office for 
Budget Responsibility (OBR, 2020) which estimated a 13% loss for the 
UK for their three month lockdown scenario. Whilst similar models 
could be produced for other countries, the policy scenarios and health 
effects used in our model are UK-specific. Since many high income 
countries have broadly similar economic structures, similar in-
terventions might be expected to yield similar economic impacts in other 
high income country contexts. However, the current UK scenarios tend 
to be slightly more restrictive than those currently employed in most 
other high income country contexts. With regard to other country con-
texts, research indicates that while many high income countries have 
strong social protection mechanisms in place, which may allow for 
similar types of intervention for Covid-19 mitigation, many lower- and 
middle-income countries have weaker social protection mechanisms 
(Loayza, N. & Pennings, 2020). Therefore, the selection of and adher-
ence to mitigation policies in other lower- and middle-income country 
contexts is likely to differ. In addition, there may be country variations 
in terms of those who are most at risk of infection, those who are most at 
risk of dying, access to healthcare, and there may be variations in risk of 
transmission to those who are most economically active. However, the 
conclusions, particularly regarding the relative importance of health and 
non-health impacts and the relative impact of different types of inter-
vention are likely to be of broad relevance to many country contexts. 
Our simulations show that the direct health-related economic im-
pacts of Covid-19 in the UK are likely to be substantial: around 2% of 
GDP and approximately equivalent to one quarter of the usual UK 
spending on health for a given year. Furthermore, our sensitivity anal-
ysis shows that halving or doubling key parameters will at most halve or 
double the health-related economic burden impact and therefore our 
results are reasonably robust to variations in epidemiological assump-
tions. In any ‘normal’ year, these health costs alone would be of sig-
nificant concern, but our simulations suggest that the costs of mitigating 
or suppressing Covid-19 are likely to be 7 to 16 times larger, respec-
tively, depending on whether a mitigation or suppression strategy is 
considered. Current epidemiological modelling of non-pharmaceutical 
behavioural interventions to combat Covid-19 suggests that the pack-
age of interventions, that have been applied in the UK, are necessary in 
order to suppress the pandemic to a level whereby intensive care units 
will be able to cope with the number of cases. However, our analysis 
suggests that the different elements of the package have very different 
cost implications. 
Our simulations do not attach a direct cost to the enforcement of 
social distancing of the over 70s. In practice, social distancing of the 
elderly will have an economic impact on consumption since the elderly 
consume goods and services across sectors, some of which they may not 
be able to access so easily from home. However, since we have captured 
the closure of many non-essential businesses, the decline in demand 
from the elderly need not be captured separately. The department for 
Education conducted a survey in 2018 (DfE, 2018) which suggested that 
38% of working parents utilise care by relatives or friends in order to 
enable them to work. Therefore, if social distancing of the over 70s were 
not in place, it is likely that this would mitigate the cost of closing 
schools, but in the case of Covid-19 no care for school children by 
members outside the immediate household is possible and therefore the 
impact of school closures on lost labour by working parents cannot be 
mitigated by alternative care arrangements. Therefore, although the cost 
of social distancing by the over 70s is not captured separately in our 
analysis, it does have a bearing on the cost of mitigation or suppression 
of the disease since it eliminates the option for working parents to use 
elderly family members or friends to care for their children while they 
work. In such circumstances, where care for school children and support 
of their education from home must be managed within the household, 
the impact on working parents is highly uncertain and the reality may 
differ from our estimates, which are based on evidence from working 
mothers. 
The current implementation of home quarantine for 14 days when an 
individual within a household is suspected of Covid-19 infection in-
creases the economic burden of Covid-19 since it increases the duration 
of work absence by infected individuals. In our simulations, this con-
tributes up to £5.9bn of additional costs to the UK economy. 
Lost labour by working parents attributable to school closures is 
estimated to have a substantial impact on the UK economy whether it be 
for 12 weeks of pandemic mitigation (approx. £66bn) or for the longer 
suppression package (£166bn). Whilst the degree to which parents can 
continue to work under these conditions is difficult to predict and will 
vary according to the type of work undertaken, it is apparent that the 
closure of schools combined with the inability of parents to access care 
arrangements outside the household is likely to prove disruptive and 
costly. 
Our simulations of the closure of recreational businesses, hotels and 
restaurants indicate that, depending on the duration of the closure, the 
impact on the UK economy of these closures could range between 
approximately £55bn and £140bn. We have assumed that approximately 
90% of these businesses will close while government policies of miti-
gation or suppression are in place. Currently UK hotels are accessible to 
key workers and homeless residents during the pandemic and some food 
retailers are supplying take-away food, but it is not currently possible to 
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verify how closely this mirrors the 10% of hotel/restaurant activity we 
have assumed to continue during mitigation/suppression. Recreation 
sectors have closed almost completely in the UK and our assumption that 
90% of such businesses will close may, therefore, be an under-estimate 
of this closure effect. 
The most substantial economic impacts simulated in our model occur 
due to the closure of the remaining non-essential businesses, i.e. beyond 
hotels and restaurants and recreational sectors, and these closures are 
also the most difficult to estimate. Currently UK workers are being 
encouraged to stay home and also to work from home where possible. 
There may be variations across sectors in terms of the extent to which 
businesses either scale-back or continue at close to normal levels 
through home-working arrangements and this will depend on the nature 
of the work/businesses affected. However, our illustrative scenarios 
highlight that if 50% of remaining non-essential businesses were to 
close, this could provoke unprecedented losses to the UK economy 
ranging between £155bn for 12 weeks of mitigation to £386bn for 
suppression. The extent of these costs highlights a key trade-off that will 
be faced by business owners when deciding how and how long they can 
adjust their working practices to conform to social distancing 
requirements. 
Clearly the losses estimated under the suppression scenario, where 
nearly 22% of GDP is lost through combined business closures over a 
nine month period, are not likely to be sustainable. As mentioned 
earlier, the SARS outbreak highlighted how struggling businesses failed 
and many employees lost their jobs under less severe economic cir-
cumstances than those predicted by our modelling. Therefore, the UK 
government will face increasing pressures to lift restrictions, even in 
periods where increasing transmission may dictate that the restrictions 
on social and economic activity should be (re-)instated or to enact policy 
initiatives which may help businesses and employees e.g. via labour re- 
training and new infrastructure for tele-working, or re-organisation of 
workplaces to maintain social distancing and, at the same time, to keep 
new coronavirus reproduction numbers under control. Currently eco-
nomic support mechanisms have been put in place by the UK govern-
ment to encourage conformity with business closure instructions and 
these include measures such as the Coronavirus Job Retention scheme, 
schemes for claiming back statutory sick pay paid due to Covid-19 and 
various reliefs and funds from which businesses and self-employed 
workers may claim for Covid-19 related losses. These measures are 
essential, but our analysis indicates that the £330bn pledged on 17th 
March by the UK Chancellor may not be sufficient if the policies imposed 
to combat Covid-19 in the UK exceed the duration specified under our 
mitigation scenario. 
In terms of the motivation for our scenarios, the mitigation scenario 
we have implemented was designed to reduce the extent to which de-
mand for ICU beds exceeds supply, but not necessarily to suppress the 
pandemic to manageable levels. However, since the production of the 
modelling study underlying this analysis was produced, the capacity for 
managing critical cases of Covid-19 in the UK has expanded via the 
construction of the new NHS Nightingale hospital and new ventilators 
have been produced for use during Covid-19. Nonetheless, the UK 
government’s motivation to pursue future mitigation and suppression 
seems to remain strong. 
Several questions remain which cannot be addressed in our 
comparative static modelling simulation. Aside from the uncertainties of 
the disease itself, the most important questions which have not been 
addressed in our simulations relate to the medium and long-term effects 
of the outbreak. Our results illustrate the potential direct and indirect 
economic impacts of Covid-19 and prevention behaviours and those 
costs appear to be substantial. However, experience shows that a pro-
portion of the costs of previous outbreaks, such as SARS, proved to be 
temporary and many of the losses during the outbreak were made-up 
subsequently and this is likely to be the case for Covid-19. However, 
this optimism should be tempered by the possibility that, as with SARS, 
economic declines from a pandemic can cause struggling businesses to 
fail and result in a longer-term increase in unemployment. This was the 
case for businesses in the Hong Kong Hotel sector during SARS, and 
business failures may also affect the degree to which the UK economy 
and livelihoods return to normal levels after Covid-19. That is, there 
could be longer-term and structural implications that our single-period 
model has not been able to establish. The unknown dynamic effects 
may, therefore, have important implications to set our results in context. 
If, following the pandemic, a subsequent economic bounce-back, in the 
medium term, is enhanced through additional economic support mea-
sures, it may be possible to limit the permanency of some of the eco-
nomic repercussions predicted in our worst case scenario results. 
However, it should also be highlighted that, in the absence of an effec-
tive vaccine, the economic constraints imposed on the UK economy by 
Covid-19 and suppression policies could continue beyond 2020 
imposing longer-term economic losses and requiring longer-term eco-
nomic support to sustain businesses and workers. Therefore, it is clearly 
important from the health and economic perspectives that every effort is 
made to rapidly develop and obtain an effective vaccine which will 
alleviate the need for significant population-wide preventive actions. 
Furthermore, from the economic perspective, further analysis might 
show that additional government mitigation initiatives, including in-
vestment in temporary hospitals and ICU equipment and staff, may also 
be justified in order to maintain longer periods of ‘normal’ economic 
activity between periods of suppression in order to alleviate the strain on 
the UK economy of non-pharmaceutical preventive actions. However, 
more information on the costs, timescale and feasibility of additional 
construction of temporary ICU units and provision of ICU equipment 
would be required in order to evaluate this hypothesis since the facilities 
produced to date have been under-utilised. 
One final aspect of the macroeconomic impacts of Covid-19 which 
cannot be assessed using our single country model are the consequences 
of pandemics on global movement and trade. These can be captured 
using global CGE models. Global CGE studies of Covid-19 to date include 
an application of the G-Cubed model (McKibbin & Fernando, 2020), the 
ImpactECON Supply-Chain Model (Walmsley et al., 2020) which is a 
modified version of the GTAP model, and the ENVISAGE model 
(Maliszewska et al., 2020). All three model frameworks rely on the 
global GTAP data base. The McKibbin model application, which is the 
most sophisticated of these global model applications, explores a range 
of country-specific shocks involving direct health-related shocks 
(morbidity and mortality-related labour force impacts), and indirect 
shocks to equity risk premia, sector-specific (transport) costs of pro-
duction, consumer preferences (and consumption demand), and gov-
ernment expenditures. However, due to the early publication date 
(end-of-February 2020), the study relies heavily on data from the 2003 
SARS epidemic from China. One global CGE model has been used to 
assess the direct health related impacts of Covid-19 (Maliszewska et al., 
2020). These estimates are broadly in line with our direct health esti-
mates (a 2%–5% fall in GDP for various countries). Whilst future addi-
tional Covid-specific analyses of the global trade implications of policy 
interventions from global models would be complementary to this 
analysis, they are unlikely to capture the tailored policy specifications 
used in our single country context. 
5. Conclusion 
Covid-19 has the potential to impose unprecedented economic im-
pacts on the UK economy and those impacts are likely to be dominated 
by the indirect costs of mitigation or suppression of the pandemic. 
Therefore, although priority should be given to policies which delay and 
flatten the pandemic peak by mitigating the spread of the disease, our 
estimates indicate that the duration of mitigation or suppression policies 
are key to determining the economic impact. According to our simula-
tions, the initial economic support mechanisms, promised by the UK 
government, may require further expansion if the pandemic is to be 
effectively suppressed without causing the collapse of many businesses 
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and the loss of livelihoods of many workers. The need for additional 
support will depend critically on whether the government is able to 
reduce the duration of business and school closures through other ini-
tiatives, e.g. via labour re-training and new infrastructure for tele- 
working, or through re-organisation of workplaces to maintain social 
distancing and keep new coronavirus reproduction numbers under 
control, until a vaccine is developed and ready for mass-production. 
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